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THE TACTICS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: MEASURES SHORT OF WAR

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The post cold war era offers new challenges to those formulating national security policies. Some analysts have argued that economic measures are growing in significance and that economic strength and prosperity will be the new sources of power in the coming decades. This paper examines one aspect of this use of economic strength, that of economic sanctions. The study points out that economic sanctions operate in an extremely complex environment and that in order to analyze their use and effectiveness, it is important to view them systemically. As such, the paper offers a conceptual model that captures the major features of this process. The paper then further analyzes sanctions with the use of this model, focusing on potential policy goals for sanctions and effects on the targeted state and the imposing state. The study concludes that sanctions, while certainly an important addition to the statecraft process, will continue to play only a limited role in the national security process.

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The Tactics Of Economic Sanctions: Measures Short Of War

An Individual Study Project

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Abstract

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The post cold war era offers new challenges to those formulating national security policies. Some analysts have argued that economic measures are growing in significance and that economic strength and prosperity will be the new sources of power in the coming decades. This paper examines one aspect of this use of economic strength, that of economic sanctions. The study points out that economic sanctions operate in an extremely complex environment and that in order to analyze their use and effectiveness, it is important to view them systemically. As such, the paper offers a conceptual model that captures the major features of this process. The paper then further analyzes sanctions with the use of this model, focusing on potential policy goals for sanctions and effects on the targeted state and the imposing state. The study concludes that sanctions, while certainly an important addition to the statecraft process, will continue to play only a limited role in the national security process.

A senior statesman, examining the post war realities and constraints concerning the use of power to further United States interests, made the following statement:

> "A nation that is boycotted is a nation that is in sight of surrender. Apply this economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will be no need for force. It is a terrible remedy. It does not cost a life outside the nation boycotted, but it brings a pressure upon the nation which, in my judgment, no modern nation could resist."[1]

This forceful quote is not from a post cold-war warrior, but rather another observer struggling to achieve a new vision for national security. The problems facing Woodrow Wilson bear a marked resemblance to the environment of today. Old foes have been vanquished, there is no nationally recognized threat, and the concept of collective security promises to solve resource and moral dilemmas.[2]

Again, after World War II, we faced another period in which we reexamined strategic realities. Central to this discussion was the interplay of the various means of power. Containment eventually became the agreed strategy concerning our principal threat, the emerging Soviet Union. However, there was widespread disagreement on the best means to accomplish containment. Some, such as containment's principal author, George Kennan, saw containment broadly, focusing on political, social, and economic policies as predominant. Even military leaders such as George Marshall agreed. Others thought that the role of the military, primarily given our early monopoly of nuclear weapons, was the key to success.[3]

Today the same debate continues even more forcefully. Some analysts believe that economic power and competitiveness have assumed an even

greater importance than in the past. Japan is often cited as an example: a country with a small military but a big role in the world due to its economic strength. Former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger has pointed out in this regard: "American society must recast its definition of power to include such elements as economic competitiveness, productivity and investment in industry."[4]

The purpose of this essay is to examine one aspect of the economic approach to national power, that of the role of economic sanctions. Before proceeding, it is important to define this concept. Past academic scrutiny, however, has left little general agreement on a precise definition. Economic sanctions can be broadly approached, including such aspects as trade policy and protectionism versus free markets, or more narrowly delineated, dealing with more precise tools such as tariffs, quotas, boycotts, controls and other more precise, targeted levers. To limit the scope of this work, the following narrow definition will be used:

> "Economic sanctions are penalties inflicted upon one or more states by one or more others, generally to coerce the target nation(s) to comply with certain norms that the boycott initiators deem proper or necessary. Sanctions may take the form of a refusal to export to the target nations, to import from it, or both. In addition, capital flows, wealth held in the boycotting states, and movements of people, both tourist and others, may be interfered with or restricted."[5]

This paper is arranged into three broad sections. First, it will present a broad policy model within which sanctions operate. The purpose is to view sanctions systemically, in their broad political context. Too often writings

on sanctions view them as strictly economic, when in fact, the key to successful policy is to understand their domestic and international political environments. Second, the paper will discuss the broad policy goals which economic sanctions can address. Sanctions have particular strengths and weaknesses as levers and only by understanding these can decision makers employ them effectively. Finally, the paper examines in further detail two key areas within the policy process—the economic impact on the target state, and the impact on the imposing state. Based on the analysis in these three sections, the paper will conclude with some comments on the role of sanctions in future policy options.

In attempting to answer these questions, it is useful to keep in mind George Kennan's warning that "it would be a mistake to overrate the usefulness of the economic weapons when they are used as a means of counterpressure against great totalitarian states, especially when those states are themselves economically powerful."[6] This paper will expand Kennan's warning to include a wide variety to states and circumstances. There has been a marked tendency to overemphasize economic sanctions and to create goals for which they are either ill-suited or inappropriate. On the other hand, when properly analyzed and strategically employed, sanctions can be a valuable tool for the statesman.

A Sanctions Model

To fully understand the role of sanctions in the national security policy process, it is important to view them in broad context. The model at figure 1 is a simple explanatory diagram that dissects the essential

elements of the policy process.[7] The salient feature of the model is that while economic sanctions operate in the economic sphere, their actions and reactions can only be understood and analyzed as they interact with the political process.



Figure 1

All this begins (Stage I) when the target state (the state about to be on the receiving end of economic sanctions) takes some action which is viewed by the sending state (the state imposing economic sanctions) as contrary to its national interest. The action may be military in nature: for example, seizing

disputed border territory. It may be an economic action: during the period 1968-1974, for instance, the U.S imposed sanctions to settle claims resulting from Peru's nationalization of assets owned by U.S. corporations.[8] Sanctions have also been invoked for political reasons, to destabilize an unfriendly regime; for ideological reasons, to protest human rights violations; or for environmental causes, to protest inadequate nuclear safeguards.

Whatever the reason, the sending state (Stage II) must decide how to react. Key players perform a strategic calculation and determine which policy levers are best suited to address the problem. Decision makers may choose between a panoply of options that may be broadly categorized as diplomatic, political, economic, or military. Two of the most important considerations are the vulnerability of the target to any particular lever and the policy goals the state wishes to achieve. Both of these considerations will receive further attention in later sections of this paper.

The examples given above indicate a key principle of the calculation: there is an asymmetry between action and reaction by the two states. Actions by the target state may be political, military or economic and yet still lend themselves to economic levers by the sending state. In other words, economic action by the sending state must be viewed in broader terms than purely within the economic realm. Failure to understand this key point will lead to a limited view of the entire process.

Another aspect of the decision to invoke sanctions is that economic sanctions have always been a popular option throughout history. In one study, 103 cases were documented beginning with the blockade of Germany in World War I.[9] It is important to note, as these cases illustrate, that economic sanctions are rarely imposed in isolation. Almost always

they are accompanied by diplomatic and political efforts to solve the crises. This also applies to the military option; the threat of military action can always be implied, even if the sending state does not wish to send a military signal. However, in order to simplify the analysis, this study will assume that economic sanctions are used either in isolation, or that they are the leading and predominant policy option. It will be difficult when using historical examples to separate the components as easily.

The next stage of the model (III) demonstrates that, in many circumstances, particularly in those states that possess free market economies, the policy goals are implemented by agencies other than those initiating the policy. This is key for two reasons. First, it means that there can be a divergence of goals. Commercial firms, for example, rely on trade to maximize profits. Thus, there will be pressures to resist or circumvent the policy goals if at all possible. This is not to imply that all or even most corporations will consciously cheat or trade illegally. Rather, it is to point out the pressures to do so; and if there are issues of interpretation, then it is not unusual for rational actors to make decisions in their favor. A good example is trade restrictions on goods intended for military purposes. A transport aircraft may be used for legitimate commercial purposes. It may also be used, however, to haul military troops and equipment.[10]

The second point is that the costs of the policy will be unevenly distributed if the sanctions are primarily enforced by private agencies. While there are methods to alleviate this problem, it is important that these consequences be evaluated. One example is the grain embargo imposed on the former Soviet Union following that country's invasion of Afghanistan. Clearly U.S. farmers and grain exporting companies bore the

initial costs. This was an important point in the divisiveness of the policy following President Carter's decision to use this weapon in 1980.[11]

This second point is illustrated by stage IV of the model. As the grain embargo example illustrates, the choice of economic sanctions by the sending state has an immediate impact on that state's domestic economy, with attendant political ramifications. If the policy consequences are not properly analyzed, the sending state may be surprised and have to modify its policy. Hence the model demonstrates a feedback loop to the policy option phase (II) as policy makers reexamine and adjust to the newly emerging realities.

One way to avoid such divisiveness is by multinational coordination of economic sanctions. Collective action not only increases the chances for effective policy, but also plays an important role in consensus building in the international environment. Furthermore, solidarity spreads risks, reduces vulnerabilities, and may add to domestic support for the policy process.[12]

In fact, given the increased interconnectiveness of the world economy, it may be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to impose effective measures without incorporating the support of many allies in the international arena. The world economic market is too open and too flexible to allow a single country to dominate a single market. This is true for generic goods, such as oil and food, but also for seemingly differentiated goods like sophisticated weapons. Also important is the role played by multinational corporations. The dramatic changes as lines of communication open mean that imports and exports no longer have a single origin and destination. Their flow is likely to be tortuous, with multiple inputs, assembly processes and distribution chains. For example,

one investigative reporter discovered that eleven Bell helicopters received by the embargoed countries of South Africa and Rhodesia were built in Italy under American license, exported to Israel, sold to a U.S. controlled company in Singapore, and then shipped to their final destinations.[13]

The desirability of achieving international support, however, may have undesirable consequences. First of all, consensus building can be viewed as strong arm tactics. U.S. pipeline sanctions against the Soviet Union were characterized as alliance busting. The editor of *Le Monde*, put it this way: "Anyway, no European government is ready to yield to American pressure on this issue; they would be afraid to lose the coming elections. It is a problem of dignity and sovereignty."[14] Second, the process of coordinating international support, even if achievable, may be too costly in terms of the political and diplomatic capital expenditure. Finally, it may only take one or two nonsupporters to circumvent even the most carefully coordinated action.

The difficulties involved have led one researcher to conclude that the importance of international cooperation has been overplayed. In other words, the necessary effort to enlist the assistance of numerous allies in the sanctioning process may prove to be more costly than their expected contribution. However, since it is also true that too many allies opposing sanctions may be equally costly, he concludes:

> "To be sure, international cooperation serves three useful functions; it increases the moral suation of the sanction; it helps isolate the target country from the global community; it preempts foreign backlash, thus minimizing corrosive friction within the alliance. These observations...suggest that forced international 'cooperation' brought about by the

> heavy hand of extraterritorial controls will seldom yield desirable results. Sanctions should be either deployed unilaterally—because the impact on one's allies is slight—or they should be designed in cooperation with one's allies in order to reduce backlash and evasion."[15]

The international aspects of coordinated policy are illustrated in the model at stage IIIa, with the dashed lines indicating it is possible to chose sanctions without incorporating allies if the circumstances warrant. At a minimum, allied coordination and cooperation must be considered by policy makers.

The next stage of the model (V) describes the impact on the target country. To begin with, sanctions may have an effect on the public or the private sector. Restrictions on military technology would clearly result in costs in the governmental sector, while a suspension of a certain commodity might have an impact on a private enterprise. In either case, the cost of the sanctions would not be spread uniformly through out the economy. This cost distribution can be critical as the target country responds and reacts to the sanctions.

The model also illustrates that an actual economic impact is not absolutely necessary to make an effect (the dashed line from III directly to VI). The best example is in the case of threats, either direct or indirect, of economic sanctions.[16] It is also true that economically ineffective sanctions may also play a role in this adversarial process. The mere fact of being isolated may create the necessary political conditions that create results.

If there are economic costs to the target country, they will be transmitted politically to the decision makers in the target country (V to

VI). The reality of the costs may be difficult to determine. The perception of the price to be paid is the key variable and will influence the next action by the targeted state. Here there are a number of concerns in which such variables as misperception, risk taking, and national honor all play major roles. For example, will the leaders react rationally? In other words, will the governmental elites make a strategic calculation concerning the costs of compliance verses noncompliance. Furthermore, rational behavior may be difficult to predict given the large cultural differences that exist in the diverse nation states of the world. Moreover, it is not always true that the signal sent by the imposing state, and translated into economic means will be clear in and of itself. Thus, seemingly irrationally behavior on the part of the target state may simply be a result of unclear signals transmitted by the sending country. In another example, the target's response will normally be governed by the intensity with which it stands by the original decision beginning this process. For example, a decision to invade another country would suggest interests of the highest order, and would thus be immune from even the greatest economic pressures.

Taking all this into consideration, the governing leaders of the targeted country (returning to I in the model) now have three basic decisions.

- **Modify policies to remove sanctions**
- **Continue current policies**
- **Pursue a different policy direction**

The third option requires the most detailed explanation because it is the most common reaction. The target state may enter negotiations to reach a compromise solution. Another possibility is for the target state to escalate, for example impose sanctions of its own, or pursue a heightening of tensions through diplomatic, political, or even military means. The

sanctions imposed against Castro in the early 1960's are a good example. Rather than accept the consequences of U.S. import limitations, Castro resolved to further ties with the Soviet Union, which of course was to have profound implications for U.S. decision makers.

The final portion of the model demonstrates two points. First, the process is iterative. Once the target country has chosen its response, the imposing decision makers must often reevaluate, adjust, and modify their decisions. The other point is indicated at stage VII. Occasionally, in spite of the best analysis of the target state's options and reactions, a totally unexpected result may occur. Sanctions may spark internal political violence and revolution. Political fragmentation may similarly create unexpected outcomes. Or the target country may pursue a countervailing strategy of stark dimensions. Perhaps the best example of this is the U.S. embargo of Japanese oil in 1941, followed one month later by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.[17]

This brief look at the policy model has highlighted three significant differences from most policy tools. First, sanctions are the only instruments of strategy that require private sector implementation. The significance is that domestic consensus building, while important for military, political and diplomatic strategies, takes on added importance. Second, the consequences of the policy do not necessarily have a direct impact on the opposing policy makers. This creates one more step in the chain of events, thereby increasing the possibility for uncertainty and ambiguity. Finally, if the sending state wishes to create a strong economic impact with its sanctions, coordination among allies is a necessity.

Policy Goals

Economic sanctions, like other policy tools have been used to achieve a wide array of national security objectives. Their use over time has changed, however. Prior to World War I, they were used primarily in conjunction with military force.[18] In the interwar years, there was a growing feeling that sanctions could achieve significant results without the use of force. When Italian and Abyssinian forces clashed at Wal-Wal on 5 December 1935, the League of Nations, led by the United Kingdom, tried this new concept. Winston Churchill remarked: "First, the Prime Minister had declared that sanctions meant war; secondly, he was resolved there must be no war; and thirdly, he decided upon sanctions."[19] The clear failure of this approach led to other applications in the post war years.

After World War II, policy makers discovered wider and broader applications for sanctions. At the same time the application of economic sanctions became more prevalent. For example, a prominent study found only two instances during the period 1920-1925, three from 1935-1940, ten during the period 1960-1965, and 24 from 1980 until 1985.[20] More importantly, policy moved away from military to political and ideological goals. Examples include the economic sanctions imposed by the United States for human rights violations in South Africa (1962—sanctions were imposed with the United Nations), Rhodesia (1965—here the United States followed the lead of the United Kingdom), Uganda (1972), South Korea (1973), and South Korea (1973). Perhaps the best example of this broadening trend was the 1975 Jackson-Vanik amendment. Here, the Congress passed legislation which prohibited extension of most-favored

nation status to nations with centrally planned economies that restricted emigration.[21]

With this broad historical transformation, it is possible to define the distinctive general goals which economic sanctions can achieve.[22] Within the context of the model, (returning to Stage II where statesman select policy options), it is important to realize that economic sanctions differ in many ways from other levers and are not appropriate for all policy goals. Furthermore, sanctions have particular strengths and weaknesses toward particular goals, which, if properly understood, can increase the chances for success.

To Punish Transgressions

Economic sanctions are the only policy measures, short of war, which impose a monetary cost on the target states. All other measures do their work through the threat of cost. Diplomatic and political measures achieve their results through persuasion, while military measures, unless combat is joined, also work through threats and persuasion. In this sense, economic sanctions are very similar to the criminal justice system, where transgressing states, like individual criminals, are levied fines for unlawful behavior. The fact that sanctions impose punishment on a collective rather than an individual has important implications that will be examined later.

If the policy goal is to punish the target state, the sanctions model demonstrates that this goal can be accomplished without multilateral coordination. It may be too difficult politically to secure consensus, or the sending state may wish to act quickly. By carefully selecting the specific sanction, the sending state can achieve the goal of punishment without expending political and diplomatic capital in a lengthy, consensus building

process. One example is the U.S. reduction of loans to Peru in 1968 following that country's decision to purchase sophisticated French Mirage jets.[23]

To Deter Unacceptable Behavior

Similar to other policy tools, sanctions can deter future unwanted behavior. The concepts of credibility, signaling, and capability are very similar to those in nuclear deterrence theory.[24] Economic sanctions differ from nuclear deterrence (and in fact military deterrence) in that the costs imposed are obviously much less threatening. In fact, they also differ in the sense that the costs can be adjusted along a scale from minor to severe. The target state has no way of knowing the intended intensity of sanctions. This can add another dimension of uncertainty, thus strengthening deterrence.

On the other hand, the deterrent value of sanctions is diminished because of the unstated policy goals for which they will be imposed. Concerning nuclear deterrence, the United States has explicitly stated the conditions that will result in a nuclear strike. Opposing states are deterred because they understand that the U.S. has the capability and will to do so. This is not true of economic sanctions. Because no predefined conditions exist, each case is unique. Thus target states have no way of knowing what actions will result in sanctions; past history is their only clue. As a consequence, when invoking sanctions, policy makers must understand that their decisions will have future deterrent effects. A good analogy is in the legal field, where case precedent based on common law has a determining influence on future actions and decisions.

To Compel Changes in Policy or Action

In this regard, sanctions differ very little from other policy measures. The changes may be small: to redress an economic wrong: or they may be major: to halt military aggression. As has been demonstrated, the types of policy and action modification are very broad. It is beyond the scope of this paper to dissect the full range of issues that could be examined under this heading. For the present it is enough to say that it is the art of statecraft to design policy measures, incorporating both economic and other actions, to achieve the intended effect.[25]

To Restrict and Diminish Resources

This is the most unique and challenging aspect of economic sanctions. The goal here may be further divided into two subcomponents: those measures that target specific military capabilities and those measures that target economic vitality in general. In terms of the former, the overall objective may be to impose a specific restriction, for example, on high technology or on nuclear weapons, or a more general one, of sapping economic strength. In terms of the latter, the general goal may be to stunt long term growth, or to impose significant deterioration which may have long term effects on economic viability. If the policy maker is successful, the long range capabilities of the target state may be significantly reduced. For one thing, since this objective attempts to degrade the means of the target state, it is hard to measure success. As one authority noted: "Resources diverted, inefficiencies imposed and opportunities forgone are the measure of success, and they are very hard to quantify."[26]

If the decision maker wishes only to restrict or diminish resources, the sanctions model indicates that the key components occur from stages I to

V. That is, the political translation of the economic consequences becomes much less important. However, the role of multilateral coordination (Stage IIIa) and domestic effect on the sending state (Stage IV) are heightened. This goal demands that sanctions be truly effective; a punishing policy or signaling action will not suffice. The overall effort demands a much greater emphasis on the strict economics of the situation.

To Signal Resolve

Signaling is a difficult process at best, entailing an interaction between the full range of political processes of both states. Sanctions, like all other policy tools, work by weaving a story, which may or may not be read properly by the target state. Much has been written on this topic.[27] A unique aspect of sanctions is that they impose costs on the sending state. In effect, the story says," We feel so strongly about our goals that we are willing to bear these costs to attain our will."

In theory, this should strengthen the message to the target state. If the target state receives the signal, as it was intended, and understands that the sending state is willing to undergo hardships to attain its goals, then the signaling process can be judged successful. On the other hand, signals are not always received as intended. The economic sanctions model illustrates that economic results must be transmitted politically to policy elites of the target state. If an inappropriate sanction is selected that has a weak economic effect, the resulting political message to the target policy makers may be diminished. Furthermore, if the sending state decides to incorporate allies in the sanctioning process, and the effort is ill coordinated, the resulting divisiveness within the coalition may send an entirely wrong message.

Additionally, in choosing between public or private implementation of sanctions at Stage III, the government must determine the costs and consequences of its selection. It is possible, and likely, that the costs to the sender may backfire and become divisive, as the Carter administration discovered with its decision to impose a grain embargo on the Soviet Union following that country's invasion of Afghanistan.[28] The signal came at the same time the United States had adopted on overall policy of engagement, which rested on the theory that economic and political entanglement between the two superpowers would create more responsible behavior by adversaries.[29] Coupled with the domestic turmoil caused when U.S. grain exporters strongly protested the measure, the Soviets could be excused for having difficulty receiving the proper message.

A final word on the potential policy goals that economic sanctions can achieve. First, no goal is exclusive. A particular decision to impose sanctions may and probably does pursue more than one goal. In fact, it is possible that one policy may encompass all goals, whether intended or not. President Carter's total trade ban against Uganda in 1978 is illustrative. United States goals were to punish Uganda for flagrant human rights violations, to deter other nations from similar policies, to compel policy changes (and in fact to compel leadership changes), to restrict resources that would enable Amin to continue military adventures, and to signal deep revulsion to the government and policies of the dictatorship.[30] The point is that policy makers, to understand fully the consequences of their policy, must examine each aspect.

Second, economic sanctions allow a continuum along the ends-means relationship. Other policy tools tend to be discreet. Diplomatic relations are either ongoing or not. Protests at the United Nations either are or are not

registered. But the policy maker can choose sanctions that are demonstrative or severe. Particularly when pursuing goals of punishment, restricting resources and signaling, this adds another dimension to the statecraft process. Perhaps this explains in part the popularity of sanctions; that is, it allows additional flexibility and control of the process.

Third is the element of time. If the policy goal is to punish, then timing plays a small role. Any policy that achieves some economic effect will satisfy the criteria. The other policy goals depend very much on the time element.

There is wide disagreement in the literature concerning the best time to initiate sanctions as well as required time for sanctions to realize economic results.[31] Some analysts argue that sanctions should be imposed quickly and register a shock to the economy, and consequently, the political process. Others feel that they should be approached more cautiously, with an eye on existing trade contracts that may delay the actual effect of the policy. There is similar disagreement concerning the timing of the impact on the target state. One school argues that the effect is strongest early and dissipates as the target state reacts and accommodates. Others argue that the impact is cumulative and therefore greatest in the long term. There are specific cases that support each contention. Case studies have come to different conclusions, and at this point, the best that can be said is that the timing aspects of implementation and effect must be analyzed on a case by case basis.

Against the backdrop of the potential policy goals of sanctions, certain stages of the conceptual model can now be examined in greater detail. Specifically, the economic impact on the target state (Stage V), and the economic and political effects on the sending state (Stage IV). These

selected areas do not indicate that they are of greater importance than others, simply that they are unique to the policy tool of sanctions.

Impact of Sanctions on Target States

The economic cost to the target country as well as the timing and distribution of this cost within the target state play key roles in determining how strong a signal will be sent to the political process. The overall cost of sanctions to the target state is of key importance, for if there is little or no impact, the measures become merely symbolic. Along this line, the vulnerability of a target state to sanctions comes into play. Although no nation is self sufficient, trade plays a different role in each country. Thus sanctions against a country whose economy relies heavily on trade is more vulnerable than one where internal trade is the driving factor for the economy. The distribution and types of imports, exports and financial matters play important roles. Countries with a key or single major import or export, oil for example, are often more vulnerable than those with more diversified economies.

Historically, the overall impact of sanctions has been surprisingly small. One important study found that sanctions rarely produced results that caused the targeted country's Gross National Product (GNP) to decrease by over 1% on an annual basis.[32] The League of Nations sanctions against Italy in 1935 were estimated to be 1.7% and the U.S. sanctions on the Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic equaled 1.9% in 1960. Two examples of instances where the large economic costs created by sanctions were generally judged to be effective in achieving policy goals were the U.S.

sanctions against Iran in 1979 (3.8%) and the UN sanctions against Rhodesia (13%). In the case of Iran, it was the financial freeze that had a greater impact than trade restrictions.[33]

On the other hand, it is possible to cite other cases with large economic costs to the target state that had little or no success in achieving policy goals. U.S. sanctions against Cuba in 1960 (4.9%) and those against Kampuchea in 1975 (President Ford imposed a total embargo and froze Kampuchean assets in the United States) totaling 6.8% of GNP were largely failures.[34] These are, however, exceptions. In general, the higher the cost to the target state, the more likely that sanctions will succeed.

But if this conclusion is true, why have sanctions been unable to impose higher costs to the target state? The answer in general is that methods of evading sanctions are only limited by the imaginations of all parties involved in the trading patterns. More specifically, there is the fact that the target state can make internal economic adjustments which provide many options to resist or minimize the impact of sanctions. Among the more obvious examples are stockpiling, producing substitute goods (synthetic rubber is a good example), and developing internal industries to replace imports. Rhodesia, in spite of the UN imposed embargo from 1965-1974, was able to achieve growth rates of 6% annually by using many of these methods.[35] And South Africa's Minister of Defense has described the arms embargo against his country as "a mixed blessing...we are at this stage basically self sufficient as regards to surface weapons."[36] That country also demonstrates another tactic of simply shifting the burden of sanctions from politically important groups to those less influential, and most likely, those already suffering from economic deprivation.

Equally important, there are economic forces that quickly come into play when trade is disrupted. Trade is a mutually beneficial act, and the market possesses powerful mechanisms to consummate deals. Within the sending country, for instance, private companies may legitimately interpret policies and matters of interpretation in their favor. Up to this point, the sanctions model has assumed that the inclusion or exclusion of other states is a policy option. In many cases, however, third parties to the sanctioning process will enter the process irrespective of the sending country's wishes. Allies may agree and support policies, but take a less than active role in preventing companies from filling the trade vacuum. Many countries, particularly the Europeans, have a much less interventionist role in trade in the first place. Neutrals or countries friendly to the target country can often make up lost trade. This was particularly true when the cold war superpowers vied for control around the world.

The results of the Cuban embargo are a good example of this tendency. Although one study found that the direct cost due to U.S. actions was $9 billion the increased trade from the Soviet Union amounted to $16.7 billion, leaving Cuba with a net gain from the sanctions of over $7 billion.[37] This and other cases gave ammunition to some critics who complained that sanctions were driving nations into the communist sphere. To compound problems, Mexico, Canada, Japan and Spain increased their trade with Cuba during this period. Canadian trade increased ninefold, thus effectively mitigating much of the sanctions.[38]

The black market is ano force that plays an important role during trade disruption. Suppliers in this market have had a great deal of success in providing almost any product if the price is sufficiently high. The

international black market in arms, to include high technology, is notoriously difficult to control. One study of the embargo of South Africa, for example, concluded that "There are innumerable agents abroad anxious to sell weapons illegally to South Africa. Such black market offers are regularly received for every kind of military hardware including Mirages, Starfighters and Leopard tanks."[39]

In all these efforts, although the ability to impose economic costs has proven difficult, even seemingly small figures can lead to results if applied judiciously and with a clear understanding of their impact. After all, even changes in the 1%-2% range can be viewed as important. A 3% growth rate (good growth) compared to 1.5% (anemic), or 0.5% (economy dead in the water) compared to 1% (recession with political results) illustrates the point.

As the sanctions model demonstrates, however, it is not the ultimate economic cost, nor the internal distribution of these costs, but their political effect on the target country that ultimately determines their outcome. In a country with a cohesive and supportive population, sanctions may simply stiffen resolve and protract conflict. In countries with unpopular regimes, large discrepancies in the distribution of income, and organized popular unrest, sanctions may further erode legitimacy and bring significant results. The distribution internally of the costs plays an important role in determining the results. "Problems [arising from sanctions] can be solved one at a time," one analyst concluded after studying how Rhodesia transferred the consequences of sanctions to the politically disadvantaged "and each new success bolstered the white's confidence. The skill and resourcefulness with which the sanctions have been fought can hardly be overestimated"[40]

Impact on Imposing State

Clausewitz describes the "remarkable trinity" of the government, the army, and the people in his classic work on strategy. The complication of the people who add "primordial violence, hatred and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force" is present in the formulation of economic strategy as well.[41] While the impact of popular sentiment is present in all measures short of war, calculating their effect when using sanctions is particularly difficult. For sanctions add additional players to those normally directly involved in the strategic equation. These key players may have had little experience beforehand in the affairs of state and see themselves as unwillingly drawn in and singled out in a grand process. The grain farmers and grain exporters who found themselves punishing the Soviet Union for its invasion of Afghanistan are obvious examples.[42] This illustration also demonstrates the internal feedback loop of the sanctions model (III → IV → II) which, due to the faulty analysis of U.S. policy makers, ultimately led to a profound policy failure.

The need to identify the economic agents that will carry out the economic sanctions and to formulate policies that will insure a more equitable burden sharing is obvious. The failure to do so early and consciously will certainly complicate a process already extremely complex. When President Carter imposed export controls on oil and natural gas equipment in response to Soviet violations of human rights, officials of Caterpillar tractor presented the following chart (demonstrating the extent to which their principal oversees rival, the Japanese firm of Komatsu, had taken advantage of the sanctions) to a hearing of the Joint Economic Committee of Congress:[43]

Table 1

Soviet Purchases of Large Tractors and Pipelayers

Time Frame	Caterpillar	Komatsu
1970 — Mid-1978	1,943 units	341 units
Mid-1978 — 1981	336 units	1,998 units

Perhaps more important than specific amelioration of individual economic interests is the need to develop domestic consensus and support. David Lloyd George remarked in 1935 that, "[Sanctions] came too late to save Abyssinia, but they are just in the nick of time to save the [British] Government."[44] When other options have already been tried and found wanting, and military measures can not serve the purpose, sanctions can be a method of developing domestic support. Sanctions, in other words, can give the impression of doing something when there are few or no alternatives. One influential study came to this conclusion:

> "Indeed, one suspects that in some cases domestic political goals were the motivating force behind the imposition of sanctions. Such measures often serve to distract attention from domestic ills and to galvanize public support for the government, either by inflaming patriotic fever (illustrated by U.S. sanctions against Japan prior to World War II) or by quenching the public thirst for action (illustrated by U.S. sanctions against Qaddafi's adventurism in northern Africa)."[45]

This can be an important function of government. The very process of building this support can be the key which unlocks stronger action. The theory of morality of war requires that all attempts be made be solve

crises before resorting to force.[46] The Gulf War is a good example where sanctions proceeded military force and helped legitimize military measures.

The Gulf War also illustrates the other side of this aspect. If sanctions are ineffective and are used as a consensus building measure, there is a danger that there can be two adverse actions. First, the lack of results may lead to consensus withdrawal. The close vote in Congress authorizing military action indicates this was a distinct possibility. Second, ineffective sanctions have the opposite effect and stoke the Clausewitzian "primordial violence, hatred and enmity," thus leading to rapid escalation beyond the policy maker's desires. The traditional and historical aversion to military action make this less of a problem for the United States.

A final point must be made concerning domestic consensus building. While this paper has narrowly defined sanctions to preclude broader issues, such as trade strategy, it is impossible to separate entirely the two definitions. For if a nation is pursuing a broad policy of free trade, then, as one authority has pointed out: "The U.S. commitment to free trade as the appropriate policy for achieving its economic interests makes it difficult to justify intervention in markets to achieve security interests."[47] This difficulty is manifested in many ways, a principle complaint being that sanctions make the U.S. an "unreliable" supplier, with obvious impact on our position in world markets. These concerns can and do play a part in the domestic consensus building process, and a decision to adopt a specific action or to stress sanctions in general must be made with this clear understanding.

Summary and Conclusions

Economic sanctions add unique dimensions to the statecraft process. Yet they have unique limitations as well. The key is to find the correct circumstances and conditions that maximize their strengths and avoid their weaknesses. As such, there are no hard and fast rules governing their use. Clausewitz argued that there could be no positive doctrine for the conduct of war, that, "It is an analytical investigation leading to a close acquaintance with the subject; applied with experience...it leads to thorough familiarity with it."[48] So too it is with sanctions. The key is the analytic process.

As such, the economic sanctions model presented in this paper is a tool to dissect the dimensions of this important element of statecraft. By a detailed examination of the key components, the analyst can provide more insightful recommendations to policy makers. Coupled with a clear understanding of the appropriate policy goals that sanctions can achieve, this can lead to better policy results.

The use of sanctions in the policy process runs in cycles, and as recent events in Yugoslavia, Haiti, Cuba, Vietnam and China have shown, the current cycle is on the upswing. Sanctions have proven to be popular because they seem to strike a middle ground between diplomatic levers and military options. Thus political leaders can present themselves as doing more that just rendering indignation while avoiding the hazards and risks of using military force. This has led to a tendency, as one analyst has demonstrated, "to both overestimate the potential benefits and underestimate the potential costs of sanctions."[49]

This is not a new phenomenon, as an early observer of the Napoleonic Continental System noted:

> "From a purely economic point of view, every trade war is, strictly speaking, a paradox, for it is directed against intercourse which is profitable to both parties and therefore inflicts sufferings on its author no less than its intended victims."[50]

The coming decades will impose new challenges to U.S. national security. As statesmen search for new strategies in the face of changing realities, the demands for creative statecraft will continue. Decisions that leave too great a gap between the ends of policy and the means will leave excessive risk and the potential for failure. This has certainly been the fate of many past decisions to use economic sanctions as the principal policy tool. This need not be so. If carefully analyzed, judiciously applied and connected with other elements of national power, we may find more satisfactory results.

Notes

1 Saul K. Padover, ed., *Wilson's Ideals* (Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942), p. 18.

2 For a discussion of the strategic problems facing Wilson, see David Jablonsky, "Strategic Vision and Presidential Authority in the Post-Cold War Era," *Parameters*, No. 4, Winter 1991-1992, pp. 4-6.

3 Mark A. Stoler, *George Marshall* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1989), pp. 158-174, discusses Marshall's views on containment. For a good summary of other views, including the predominant military view, see Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 15-20.

4 Patrick E. Tyler,"As Fear of a Big War Fades, Military Plans for Little One," *New York Times*, 3 February 1992, p. A8.

5 Donald L. Losman, *International Economic Sanction's* (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1979), p. 1. Perhaps the best discussion of alternative definitions occurs in David A. Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft* (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 29-50. Baldwin uses one of the broadest definitions, "governmental influence attempts relying primarily on resources that have a reasonable semblance of a market price in terms of money." However, he provides a good overview and rationale for the other alternatives, including paragraphs on foreign economic policy, international economic policy, economic diplomacy, three different interpretations of the term economic sanctions, economic warfare, and economic coercion.

6 Giles D. Harklow and George C. Maerz, eds., *Measures Short of War* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1991), p. 10.

7 Interviews with Professor Jim Golden, Professor and Head of the Department of Social Science, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, during the period October 1991 to February 1992. Professor Golden suggested the outlines of this model and application.

8 Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered* (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1985), pp. 434-438.

9 Ibid., 13-25.

10 Shaheen Ayubi, Richard E. Bissell, Nana Amu-Brafih Korsah, and Laurie A. Lerner, *Economic Sanctions in U.S. Foreign Policy* (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1982), p. 41.

11 M.S. Daodi and M.S. Dajani, *Economic Sanctions, Ideals and Experiences* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983), pp. 135-136. For a positive analysis on the role of agriculture and raw materials as a component in foreign policy, see William Schneider, *Food, Foreign Policy, and Raw Materials* (New York: Crane, Russak and Company, Inc., 1976).

[12] James P. O'Leary, "The Utility of Economic Sanctions," *Parameters*, September 1981, p. 52.

[13] Ayubi, P. 46.

[14] "Soviet Pipeline Sanctions: the European Perspective." Hearing before the Joint Economic Committee, Ninety Seventh Congress, 22 September 1982, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 14.

[15] Hufbauer, p.90.

[16] See, for example, Claude A. Buss, *The United States and the Republic of Korea: Background for Policy*, (Stanford, Ca: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), p. 131. Buss reports " President [John F.] Kennedy told [President Park Chung Hee]—without massive publicity—that failure to hold democratic elections would jeopardize US aid to Korea. This threat was used to the full, and it worked. Elections were held, and for nearly a decade the ROK [Republic of Korea] enjoyed an essentially democratic system."

[17] For a good discussion of this point and other examples .. the policy model moving to uncharted waters, see Robert A. Doughty and Harold E. Raugh Jr., "Embargoes in Historical Perspective," *Parameters*, Spring, 1991, p. 25.

[18] Hufbauer, pp. 4-8. For another view of the history of sanctions, see Barry E. Carter, *International Economic Sanctions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 8-31.

[19] Robin Renwick, *Economic Sanctions* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Center for International Affairs, 1981), p. 23.

[20] Hufbauer, p. 25.

[21] For a different view of these shifts, see Daodi, pp. 15-54. The authors discuss the trends in terms of a paradigm shift. Specifically, they discuss how sanctions have evolved from being primarily economic in nature during the Mid-1930s to becoming both more military and political in the 1970's.

[22] David Leyton-Brown, ed., *The Utility of International Economic Sanctions* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), pp. 303-305. I have taken the broad headings from the Leyton-Brown work, but have analyzed them in a slightly different fashion.

[23] Hufbauer, pp. 430-433.

[24] See any good reference text on deterrence strategy, for example Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics* (New York: McMillan Publishing Co., 1973), pp. 375-432.

[25] For a very good analysis of economic statecraft, see David A. Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 8-28.

[26] Leyton-Brown, p. 305.

27 See, for example, Michael L. Brown, "The Economic Dimensions of Strategy," *Parameters*, Summer 1986, pp. 41-42.

28 Ayubi, pp. 21-35.

29 Brown, pp. 38-39.

30 Hufbauer, pp. 455-459.

31 Ayubi, p. 84, states that "sanctions should be imposed for only a period of months or with a view to maintaining them for years." Hufbauer, p 86, feels that "A heavy, slow hand invites both evasion and the mobilization of domestic opinion in the target country. Sanctions imposed slowly or incrementally may simply strengthen the target government at home as it mobilizes the forces of nationalism." He further explains that, "the inverse relationship between success and sanctions period argues against a strategy of 'turning the screws' on a target country." Daoudi, p. 164, argues the exact opposite, "sanctions do not work quickly: they are attritional. For sanctions to be effective, the sanctioner needs to adopt realistic expectations. The sanctions policy must be carried out in the right proportions, with the proper methods, and be given adequate time to mature." Michael L. Brown , *Economic Sanctions: A Cost-Benefit Approach* (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms International, 1985), pp. 420-422, offers yet another approach. He agrees that speed and resolution are important but that in the short term—one to two months—sanctions are not effective because inventory and full pipelines tide an economy over. In the long run—nine months to a year—the target economy can adjust to economic shocks. He concludes that it is in the middle ground that sanctions do their most damage and hence, are most effective.

32 Hufbauer, pp. 60-63.

33 Robert Carswell, "Economic Sanction and the Iranian Experience," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1981-1982, pp. 264.

34 Hufbauer, pp. 315-323 and 530-535.

35 Renwick, p. 57.

36 Ayubi, p. 45.

37 Sergio Roca, "Economic Sanctions Against Cuba" in *The Utility of International Economic Sanctions*, ed., David Leyton-Brown, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), p. 97.

38 Ibid., p. 99.

39 Ayubi, p. 46. Furthermore, in the early 1960's, South Africa was dependent on foreign arms; by the 1970's, it was 90% self sufficient. See, Bruce Barlett, "What's Wrong with Trade Sanctions," CATO Institute, *Policy Analysis*, No. 64, 23 December 1985.

[40] Ibid., p. 73.

[41] Carl von Clausewitz. *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 89.

[42] Ayubi, pp. 21-35. This presents an interesting discussion of the impact of domestic consensus on this incident. Interestingly, the economic effects on US producers were relatively mild as US producers found new markets and the government provided subsidies and compensation.

[43] "Soviet Pipeline Sanctions:The European Perspective," Hearing before the Joint Economic Committee, Ninety Seventh Congress, 22 September 1982, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office: 1983), p. 4.

[44] Peter Rowland, *David Lloyd George: A Biography* (New York: MacMillan, 1975), p. 723.

[45] Hufbauer, p. 3.

[46] James Turner Johnson, *Can Modern War Be Just* (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1984), pp. 11-29. Just war theory requires, for example, that force be used only as a last resort. Thus economic sanctions are important in using all means available before the use of military means can be contemplated.

[47] James R. Golden, "Economics and National Strategy," an unpublished paper presented at the Third Annual Strategy Conference, United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, February 1992.

[48] Clausewitz, p. 141.

[49] For an interesting discussion of this tendency, see Brown, *Economic Sanctions: A Cost - Benefit Approach*, p. 31. Brown also describes the reverse error, that is the tendency for scholars of sanctions to underestimate the potential benefits.

[50] Eli F. Heckscher, *The Continental System, An Economic Interpretation*, (Gloucester, Mass: Peter Smith 1964), p. 365.

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